Canada, a Climate of Corruption

Excerpt follows // No emphasis added // http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fc-cf/decisions/en/item/212832/index.do#_Toc465943666

X (Re)

Court (s) Database
Date
Neutral citation
File numbers


 

(1)        Changes Sought to the Warrant Templates

(a)        A New Condition for XXXXX X XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXXXXX for the XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX Warrant, and XXXXX Warrant

(b)       A New Condition Authorizing the Retention of XXX for the XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XX Warrant, XXX Warrant, and XXX Warrant

(c)        A New Condition that Would Govern XXXXX XXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX for the XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX Warrant, and XXXXXXXX Warrant

(d)       Destruction of Information

(e)        Proposition Concerning Delegation and Accountability (“Regional Director or his Designate” to be Replaced by “Service Employees”)

(i)        General Comments

(ii)       XXXXX XXXXXX

(iii)          XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX

(iv)      Further Changes from “Regional Director General or his Designate” to “Designated Service Employees” for the Task of Assessing Warrant-collected Non-target Information

(f)        XXXXX XXXXX Warrant Amendment to Remove Condition 2

(g)       Amendments to the XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX Warrant and XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX Warrant Concerning Condition 3

(h)       XXXXX Warrant – New Condition 3

(i)         Solicitor-Client Clarifications and Other Changes, of Which Some Have Already Been Agreed Upon

(j)         Further Changes Sought Following the En Banc Hearings (New Definition for “Associated Data”, Communication and Retention Period of XXXXX XXX Rather than Indefinitely)


[39]           More specifically, the ODAC processes information held by the CSIS through:

“[…] the authority of a warrant or an approved investigation. As of January 2010 […], the ODAC data holdings consisted of XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX

(See letter dated November 8, 2012 to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, signed by XXXXX XXX Coordinator – Access to Information and Privacy, at p 4. Document located in the book “Documents for Amici” as a supplement to the Affidavit of XXXXX XX (affirmed April 21, 2016), in file XXXXX XXX at Tab 10.)

[40]           The evidence presented during the hearings did not update this information to 2016 except for what follows. Aside from analysing and processing these datasets into investigative information, the ODAC:

“[…] provides operational support for these investigative activities by developing actionable intelligence XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX

(See letter dated November 8, 2012 to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, signed by XXXXX XXX Coordinator – Access to Information and Privacy, at p 3 and 4. Document located in the book “Documents for Amici” as a supplement to the Affidavit of XXXXX XXXXX (affirmed April 21, 2016), in file XXXXX at Tab 10.)

[41]           XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX The present reasons should not give the impression that the Court is well informed of the XXXXX program; only very limited evidence was provided. Given that the program was still called the ODAC at the time of the application, I will use that term and not XXXXX

[42]           The ODAC is a powerful program which processes metadata resulting in a product imbued with a degree of insight otherwise impossible to glean from simply looking at granular numbers. The ODAC processes and analyses data such as (but not limited) to: XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXX XX XXXXX XXX The end product is intelligence which reveals specific, intimate details on the life and environment of the persons the CSIS investigates. The program is capable of drawing links between various sources and enormous amounts of data that no human being would be capable of XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXX XXXXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX

[43]           The Data Exploitation Task Force provides more insight into the initial capacities of the ODAC; XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX yet the evidence presented to the Court to this effect was very limited.

XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX

(Data Exploitation Task Force Draft Report (version 1.3), dated July 11, 2005 at 10. Found at “Annex B”, Tab 4, of the book provided to the Court in response to the letter of March 23, 2016 from the Chief Justice.)

[44]           Information collected through the operation of warrants is fed into the ODAC XX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXX XXXXX the information is assessed within XXX by the CSIS; the content is destroyed if it is found to be non-threat related, or unintended for prosecutorial purposes, international affairs, or the defense of Canada. If the information remains unassessed at the end of the XXXXX it must be destroyed as mentioned above. XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX the metadata is retained indefinitely even if the underlying content is found to be non-threat related. As we will see later, understanding XXXXX XXXX is important when discussing whether or not a XXX XXX retention period is necessary and appropriate.


[208]       For the CSIS XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX

[209]       The Service obtains information XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX

[210]       The CSIS proposes that the potential usefulness of information collected through the operation of warrants for XXXXX XXXXX XX ought to be assessed at the same time as the assessment for relevancy to threats to or to target is performed.

[211]       I conclude that the retention of XXXXX XXXXX is appropriate as long as the CSIS remains barred from accessing XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXX retention must be limited to XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XX XXXXX XXXXX XXX

(c)                A New Condition that Would Govern XXXXX XXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX for the XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX Warrant, and XXXXXXXX Warrant

[212]       The CSIS suggests a new condition that would govern any XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX

[213]       This amendment is proposed in order to maintain the integrity of the information XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX

[214]       Because sections 12(1) and 21 warrants permit the collection and retention of target and threat-related information as defined at section 2 of the Act, the statutory language does not authorize the retention of information incidentally collected from non-targets unless such information can be related to the threat described in the issued warrant. Therefore, only  XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX may be retained for future use, notably for additional investigation or forensic investigation.

[215]        The information XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX unless found to be threat-related, cannot be retained for more than XXX at the most. As I will detail shortly, the two-stage XXXXX to XXXXX retention and destruction period will apply if the information XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XX obviously belongs to third-parties, is devoid of direct implications with the target, or is evidently not threat related.

[216]       I believe that such an approach addresses the concerns expressed by both sets of counsel on this topic. I note that the applicant, in its reply and in response to submissions of the amici, distinguished and proposed for the first time, XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXX Reflecting this concern requires a new condition to be drafted that will properly XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX (See Applicant’s reply submissions at para 87.)

(d)               Destruction of Information

[217]       The Court has imposed on the Service an obligation to destroy what is considered unimportant for the purposes of the investigation or what is unrelated to the targets named in the warrants. This obligation is found as a condition in various warrants.

[218]       In application XXXXX Chief Justice Crampton raised, amongst other concerns, the definition of “destroyed” and the fact that the wording of the warrant did not capture that when information is deleted, it should mean permanently deleted and irrecoverable. XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXX Therefore, this Court wants to ensure that XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX To reflect this reality, the CSIS is required to undertake that XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX

[219]       Having said this and for the sake of utmost clarity, the undertaking should establish that the CSIS XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX nor will any other agency do so on its behalf.

(e)                Proposition Concerning Delegation and Accountability (“Regional Director or his Designate” to be Replaced by “Service Employees”)


[223]       As noted above, the CSIS nonetheless proposes that the wording “Regional Director General or his Designate” be adapted to the three categories of determination found in the warrants, i.e. XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX and warrant conditions. I will review each one keeping in consideration the different scenarios but also the evolving CSIS position on this matter.

(ii)               XXXXX XXXXXX

[224]       XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX Such work must be performed by an identifiable and fully accountable senior employee of the CSIS. (See affidavit of XXXXX XXXXX dated May 24, 2016 and also his testimony of April 1, 2016 at p 49-82.)

[225]       Such XXXXX XXXXX can be found in the XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XX warrant (paragraphs 3(g), 3(h), 3(i), 6(b), 6(e), and 13(f)) and in the XXXXX XXXX warrant (paragraph 1(b)) and in the XXXXX warrant (paragraph 1). In all of these cases, presently, the important decision of adapting the warrant to non-target XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXX has to be made by one of the seven Regional Director Generals or his or her Designate.


[233]       The evidence shows that, in practice, executing a warrant involves a team of CSIS employees with a variety of expertise and field-work experience. As the conditions of warrants show, the collection of information often requires CSIS employees to assess information in order to determine whether it is threat related or not. Performing such assessments requires knowledge of the target’s daily life, environment etc. A Regional Director General cannot realistically acquire distinct knowledge of each target the CSIS identifies XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXX


 

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